Party positions
Mexico’s parties and the United States: USMCA, tariffs, migration
Where the eight parties stand on tariffs on China, ties with the United States and Canada versus Latin America, migrants crossing Mexico and the movement of workers under the USMCA, with their sources and how each group voted on the 2025 tariffs.
By Fadrique Garcia Font. .
The relationship with the United States weighs on almost everything that is debated in Mexico, and in 2026 it is more open than ever. At the July review, the United States did not confirm the extension of the USMCA (T-MEC in Spanish), the North American trade agreement: since then there will be annual reviews until the agreement’s end, set for 2036, and the US government opened a public consultation until 12 January (El CEO, 6 October 2026). Talks on the US tariffs of 25% on Mexican cars and 50% on steel and aluminum are still open, although according to Reuters they have slowed (Líder Empresarial, 16 October 2026), and since 1 January 2026 the United States has charged a 1% tax on remittances sent in cash, by money order or by cashier’s check (BBVA Research).
On the Mexican side, the most visible decision was the Chamber of Deputies’: in December 2025 it voted to raise tariffs on more than 1,400 tariff lines of products from countries without a trade agreement with Mexico, such as China, with duties of up to 50%, almost all between 5% and 50%, from 1 January 2026 (DOF, 29 December 2025). In that vote, unlike almost every other vote in this legislature, the governing coalition did not vote as one.
The test covers these questions in the topic “United States, trade and migration”. Three statements are part of the main test; a fourth, on the movement of workers under the USMCA, is only asked as a tie-breaker. These are the eight parties’ positions, each based on a roll-call vote in the Chamber, a platform, a founding document or a party statement. An asterisk (*) marks an estimated position: the party has not spoken directly on the matter and its position is inferred from what it has said on related topics. It is one of the topics with the most estimated positions: 11 of 32, because several parties say nothing in their documents about migrants in transit or workers under the USMCA.
SOMOS and Partido PAZ were registered in 2026, have no deputies and do not yet have an electoral platform: their positions come from their founding documents and statements and are provisional until they register their platforms with the INE in January 2027.
The parties’ positions
| Party | Keep high tariffs on China | Prioritize the US and Canada over Latin America | Stop migrants crossing to the United States | Free movement of workers under the USMCA (tie-breaker) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Morena | strongly agree | neutral | neutral* | neutral* |
| PAN | neutral | agree | disagree | neutral |
| PRI | neutral | agree | neutral | neutral* |
| PVEM | strongly agree | neutral* | neutral* | neutral* |
| PT | disagree | disagree | disagree | agree |
| Movimiento Ciudadano | strongly disagree | neutral | strongly disagree | agree |
| SOMOS | disagree* | neutral | disagree | strongly agree |
| PAZ | neutral* | neutral* | neutral* | neutral* |
Tariffs on China and countries without a trade agreement
“Mexico should keep high tariffs on products from China and other countries that have no trade agreement with it.” This is the statement that best separates parties that usually vote together. Two parties strongly agree, three are neutral and three disagree. Only two positions are estimated.
| Group | For | Against | Abstentions |
|---|---|---|---|
| Morena | 225 | 0 | 1 |
| PVEM | 55 | 0 | 0 |
| PT | 0 | 0 | 42 |
| PAN | 0 | 0 | 66 |
| PRI | 0 | 0 | 36 |
| Movimiento Ciudadano | 0 | 24 | 4 |
Vote in general, 9 December 2025 (Parliamentary Gazette).
In agreement, Morena and the PVEM voted for the increase. The PT, their ally, abstained: its parliamentary leader warned that an abrupt rise in tariffs, especially on intermediate goods, could create “inflationary pressures”, and argued that it would further concentrate Mexican trade with the United States (Bloomberg Línea, 10 December 2025). Its 2024 platform says countries such as China and India “should receive more attention, in order to expand trade ties” (p. 18): that is why it disagrees, even though it did not vote against.
Movimiento Ciudadano was the only group to vote against, and its platform supports “the consolidation of global markets, based on the free exchange of goods” (p. 62). The PAN and the PRI abstained and are neutral. Each party’s documents point both ways: the PAN’s program of action declares itself in favor “of free trade against protectionism” (p. 32), but its 2024 platform proposes “protecting national goods from the global market” with regard to Asia (p. 200); the PRI’s platform proposes continuing “our historic friendship with China within the framework of strengthening North America” (p. 59) and, at the same time, “a policy of rationalizing imports” (p. 45).
The positions of SOMOS (disagree) and Partido PAZ (neutral) are estimated: neither had deputies or has spoken about these tariffs. SOMOS’s program proposes to “diversify trade agreements with emerging countries and economic blocs” (p. 74), and PAZ’s, to review international agreements to “maximize their benefits” (p. 12).
North America or Latin America
“Mexico should prioritize its relationship with the United States and Canada over its relationship with Latin America.” Two parties agree, five are neutral and one disagrees.
In agreement, the PAN writes in its 2024 platform: “We will prioritize our relations with the United States and Canada” (p. 198), although it also proposes an integration mechanism with Latin America and the Caribbean. The PRI says in its declaration of principles that closer partnership with the United States and Canada, “as our main trading partners, must be a national priority”, and proposes a customs union of the three countries (p. 23).
Disagreeing, short of the extreme, the PT proposes recalibrating the relationship in view of “the urgency of consolidating a Latin American and Caribbean bloc autonomous from the US”, although the same section calls for “maintaining relations of cooperation and mutual respect with the US” and a “more balanced” relationship (2024 platform, p. 57).
Neutral, with a source: Morena calls relations with North America “clearly crucial and strategic” (2024 platform, p. 41) and its program of action calls for economic integration “with all the nations of the Americas” (p. 3); Movimiento Ciudadano speaks of its “main allies in North America” and proposes diversifying ties with Europe, Asia and Latin America (2024 platform, p. 62); and, for SOMOS, Somos MX, the organization the party grew out of, said in July 2025 that the relationship with the United States “is fundamental” (statement), while its program prioritizes ties with “nations of Latin America, Asia, Europe and Africa” (p. 74). The neutral positions of the PVEM and Partido PAZ are estimated: their documents do not put one region before another.
Migrants crossing Mexico
“Mexico should stop undocumented migrants from crossing the country on their way to the United States.” No party is in favor. Four disagree and four are neutral, but three of the eight positions are estimated.
Movimiento Ciudadano is at the extreme of the scale: its program of action supports “a humanitarian policy that promotes free transit through the national territory” (p. 12), and its declaration of principles calls for rethinking “the inhumane militaristic strategy of migration containment” (p. 18). Disagreeing, short of the extreme:
- The PT, whose program of action says migration “cannot be stopped or cease to exist” (p. 8), although its platform welcomes the government sharing with the United States the aim of containing “mass migration”.
- SOMOS, which states that “there is no such thing as illegal migration” (program of action, p. 15) and calls for Mexico to avoid becoming a “safe third country” (p. 75), while acknowledging Mexico’s role in containment.
- The PAN, which proposes alternatives to detaining migrants that allow them to move while their status is resolved (2024 platform, p. 191), as well as bringing order to irregular migration and protecting national security.
The PRI is neutral with a source: its declaration of principles calls for protecting migrants’ rights “regardless of their migration status” and, at the same time, strengthening border security (p. 23). The neutral positions of Morena, the PVEM and Partido PAZ are estimated: Morena’s platform proposes making it easier for migrants who wish to stay to settle; the PVEM’s, protecting migrants in transit; and PAZ’s declaration, a government that looks after “domestic and foreign migrants” (p. 11); none says whether Mexico should stop them.
Workers under the USMCA (tie-breaker)
“In the trade agreement with the United States and Canada, Mexico should seek the free movement of workers.” The USMCA opens trade in goods and services, but not the movement of workers: it only offers visas to some professionals. This statement is only asked as a tie-breaker.
SOMOS is the only party that strongly agrees: its program proposes, “within the framework of the Free Trade Agreement with the United States and Canada, promoting the free movement of people and services” (p. 74). Agreeing, short of the extreme: the PT, whose program says “migration must be pushed for inclusion” in the USMCA (p. 19), and Movimiento Ciudadano, whose platform criticizes states that sign trade agreements but “close their borders to those who aspire to decent work” (p. 63). The PAN is neutral with a source: it proposes expanding the temporary workers program (2024 platform, p. 198), far from free movement. The neutral positions of Morena, the PRI, the PVEM and Partido PAZ are estimated: their documents do not address the issue.
What divides the parties
On this topic there are not two blocs, as there are on justice or security. To compare the parties two by two, we add up the differences between their positions on the three statements in the main test (our own calculation; the maximum is 12; estimated positions count like the rest):
| Parties | Total difference (out of 12) |
|---|---|
| Morena and PVEM | 0 |
| PAN and PRI | 1 |
| PRI and PAZ | 1 |
| PT and SOMOS | 1 |
| Movimiento Ciudadano and SOMOS | 2 |
| SOMOS and PAZ | 2 |
| Morena and PAN | 4 |
| PAN and Movimiento Ciudadano | 4 |
| PRI and Movimiento Ciudadano | 5 |
| Morena and PT | 5 |
| Morena and Movimiento Ciudadano | 6 |
- Morena and the PVEM agree on all three: they voted together for the tariffs, and their documents (for the PVEM, by estimate) stress North America without putting it before Latin America.
- The PT, ally of both, moves away from them: 5 points from Morena and the PVEM, almost as far as Movimiento Ciudadano (6), and only 1 from SOMOS. It is set apart by tariffs, by the relationship with the United States, where it wants an autonomous Latin American bloc, and by migration.
- The PAN and the PRI almost fully agree: abstention on tariffs, priority to the United States and Canada and a nuanced position on migration.
- Movimiento Ciudadano and SOMOS, 2 points apart, oppose the tariffs and stopping migrants, and support bringing workers into the USMCA, like the PT; but, unlike the PT, they do not put Latin America before North America.
The statements on this topic count towards your affinity with each party and also, when the reference parties give them a clear direction, towards the social axis of the political compass, the values axis, because the topic includes migration; they do not count on the economic axis.
Find out more
- All the statements on the topic, with their sources: “United States, trade and migration”.
- The parties’ positions on every statement in the test: party comparison. Compare two parties, for example Morena and the PT, the PAN and the PRI or Movimiento Ciudadano and SOMOS.
- Other analyses by topic: “The parties and security”, “The parties and the judicial reform” and “The parties and social programs”.
- Party profiles: Morena, PAN, PRI, PVEM, PT, Movimiento Ciudadano, SOMOS and PAZ.
- To find out which party you agree with most across all topics: take the test.
Sources
- Official Gazette (DOF), 29 December 2025: amendment to the Tariff of the General Import and Export Duties Law (in Spanish) — New duties, from 5% to 50%, on more than 1,400 tariff lines; in force since 1 January 2026
- Parliamentary Gazette: roll-call vote of 9 December 2025, amendment to the Tariff of the General Import and Export Duties Law (in Spanish) — Votes of each parliamentary group, in general; reserved articles in table tabla2or1-81
- Bloomberg Línea, 10 December 2025: deputies pass the tariffs with a split vote by a government ally (in Spanish) — The PT’s abstention and its parliamentary leader’s arguments
- El CEO, 6 October 2026: the USMCA enters review (in Spanish) — Annual reviews of the agreement after the United States’ decision of July 2026, and a public consultation until 12 January
- Líder Empresarial, 16 October 2026: the tariff negotiations between Mexico and the United States (in Spanish) — US tariffs on cars (25%) and on steel and aluminum (50%), according to Reuters and The Wall Street Journal
- BBVA Research, 2 January 2026: the new tax on remittances (in Spanish) — US 1% tax on remittances sent in cash, by money order or by cashier’s check
- 2024 electoral platforms registered with the INE: Morena, PAN, PRI, PVEM, PT and Movimiento Ciudadano (in Spanish) — Link to the PAN’s; the others, in the INE document repository, are linked in the text with their page
- Programs of action of SOMOS and Partido PAZ (2026 registration, INE; in Spanish) — Link to SOMOS’s; Partido PAZ’s is linked in the text
- Topic “United States, trade and migration” — All the statements on the topic and the eight parties’ positions, with their sources
This analysis is for information only and is not a voting recommendation. How we work.
See also
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